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NOTES AND COMMENT
THE STATE'S TAXING POWERS WITH RESPECT TO SPECIAL
FRANCHISES.-Frequently, the rapid growth and expansion of com-
mercial activities give rise to situations, which, due to their modem
form, escape the provisions of a statute, when it is obvious that they
were meant to be controlled thereby. Very often it is this constant
change of conditions that brings about such result, but sometimes it
would appear to be due to a seeming lack of foresight upon the part
of the law-making bodies of the State. In some cases judicial legis-
lation accomplishes that for which the statute has failed to provide,
but at other times the matter is left to the Legislature to provide a
remedy by a revision of or an amendment to the statute.
An interesting situation 1 with respect to taxation of a special
franchise, has recently come before the courts of our State, which
evidently calls for the exercise of the remedial action heretofore
suggested.
The proposition is that the State has lost its power to tax a
granted right, which obviously was intended to be taxed, because the
user derives its right through an intervening entity, instead of directly
from the State.
A bridge company had been authorized by the State of New
York to build a toll bridge across the Niagara River, a navigable
stream. Since the consent of both abutting sovereignties is necessary
to the erection of a bridge over a boundary stream, the New York
company became associated with a Canadian corporation possessing
similar powers and constructed a bridge which consisted of two
levels. The upper floor was designed for use by a railroad, the lower
one being reserved for pedestrians and vehicles. Subsequently the
Legislature empowered the bridge company to contract with a rail-
road company for the leasing of the upper level, which they did soon
thereafter. A special franchise tax is now sought to be assessed
against the railroad company for its maintenance and operation of
trains over the river.
A special franchise of a railroad is a right of way granted over
a public place by the State, or some municipal officer or body acting
under its authority, with leave to construct and operate a railroad.2
A right is thereby acquired, the exercise of which except for the
grant, would be a trespass.3 A special franchise, such as the right
to construct a bridge in connection with the operation of a railroad,
over navigable public waters 4 is subject to taxation under the Tax
Law which provides that such right, authority or permission, together
IPeople, ex rel Grand Trunk Railway Co. v. Gilchrist, et al., 248 N. Y. 97
(1928).
2 People, ex rel Metropolitan Street Railvay v. Tax Commissioners, 174
N. Y. 417, 67 N. E. 69 (1903).
'People, ex rel Harlem R. & P. C. R. R. v. Tax Comsrs., 215 N. Y. 507,
109 N. E. 569 (1915).
'People, ex rel Lehigh Valley R. R. v. Tax Comsrs., 247 N. Y. 9, 160
N. E. 19 (1928).
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with the value of the tangible property used in connection therewith
shall be assessed. 5
Concededly, the bridge company has no taxable special franchise,6
because the right to tax by the State, is obtained by the granting of
permission to "construct, maintain and operate" a railroad over a
public place. The bridge company was never authorized to operate a
railroad, simply having the power finally to enter into a contract to
lease part of its structure to a railroad company for that purpose.
It is plain that if the franchise does not exist, the right to assess
does not exist.7 The railroad company received no grant from the
State other than its permission to exercise its general corporate
powers, and it secured a place wherein to exercise them, under the
lease from the bridge company, not from the State.8 In order to
create a special franchise, taxable by the State as such, the grant must
proceed directly from the sovereign to the user.
Decisions of the New York Court of Appeals in prior cases
have repeatedly enunciated the principle that the right must rest upon
public favor rather than private right.9 It is not a special franchise
if the right to use a street, for instance, has not been granted by a
political body having authority, but by abutting property owners who
own the fee in the land.' 0 Neither is it such if the use of the right
flows from the ownership of an easement in the street,"1 and this
more conclusively where the company had acquired a portion of a
river bed for a tunnel from the State.' 2
However the substance of the situation is that a public corpora-
tion is using property of the State, which escapes taxation because it
acquired its rights not from the State directly but by contract with a
third party. Under the theory that a special franchise tax is imposed
as compensation to the State for diminished public use and enjoy-
ment,'8 it would seem that the State should receive a return for the
right extended to and exercised by the railroad company. The char-
acter of the right is exactly as contemplated by the statute, and it is
unreasonable to assume that the acquisition of it through a third
I
'Tax Law (Cons. Laws, Ch. 60) Sec. 2, Subdivision 6.
People, ex rel N. F. Bridge Co. v. Tax Comsrs., 103 Misc. 648 at 652,
170 N. Y. S. 997 (1918).
7 People, ex rel Retsof Mining Co. v. P., 75 A. D. 435, 78 N. Y. S. 305, aff'd
175 N. Y. 511 (1903).8 Supra, note 1.
People, ex rel N. Y. C. R. R. Co. v. Woodbury, 203 N. Y. 167, 96 N. E.
431 (1911); People ex tel N. Y. C. & H. R. R. Co. v. Priest, 206 N. Y. 274,
99 N. E. 547 (1912).
a' Supra, note 2.
People, ex tel L. I. R. R. Co. v. Tax Comsrs., 148 App. Div. 751, 133
N. Y. S. 348, aff'd 207 N. Y. 683 (1913).
' People, ex rel Hudson & M. R. R. Co. v. Tax Comsrs., 203 N. Y. 119, 96
N. E. 435 (1911); Powell, Taxation of Corps. &c., Vol. 1, 272.
" Supra, note 4.
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party should permit evasion of the tax. The right rests indirectly on
public favor though technically it is not a special franchise.
A dissenting opinion,14 in the instant case, by Judge Andrews
emphasizes the fact that the consent of the State is indispensable to
the exercise by anyone of rights concerning the use of the bridge, for
its proprietary rights are involved. If not given, the use of the
structure by the railroad constitutes a continuing trespass. There-
fore, of necessity, a grant by the State to the railroad company may
be inferred at the time the State authorized the bridge company to
lease part of its structure for the operation of a railroad.
But it is rather difficult to make out a trespass here, for all that
is being done has been consented to by the State, though the fact
remains that no consent was granted by the State to the bridge com-
pany, which is a special franchise.' 5 Neither did the State confer a
special franchise upon the railroad company, for it could not. By
authorizing the construction of a bridge for the accommodation of
pedestrians and vehicles, it could not grant a right to someone else to
erect another bridge in the same place for a railroad. When it sub-
sequently empowered the bridge company to lease part of its struc-
ture, the State merely enlarged the powers originally given. It was
thereby enabled to contract for the operation of a railroad. This
right it could exercise or not as it saw fit. The State could not there-
after grant to another, rights which involved the use of the bridge.
To infer that a special franchise taxable as such in this case is
held by the railroad company demands a continuity of reasoning
which must overlook the nature of the facts. "To arrive at the desired
objective, with the statute as presently constituted is too great a strain
upon its logical import, at least more than is necessary, since the Yesult
may be better accomplished in another way. It is a matter which
would be better solved by action upon the part of the Legislature.
Since the bridge company in such case receives a right to contract
for its own profit, for the operation of a railroad, the granting of that
power to contract might well be taxed. On the other hand, the tax
could just as well be made upon the railroad company by expressly
providing that the exercise of such a right, while strictly not a special
franchise, is a privilege, emanating indirectly from the State, and
subject to assessment.
H. W. P.
CONSTITUTIONALITY AND MANDATORY NATURE OF THE BAUMES
LAws.-Judicial interpretations of the Baumes Laws disclose the fact
that their provisions are neither new nor unusual but, except for
" Supra, note 1 at 104.
:' Sura, note 1.
